Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fecf4673d0a0e5a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.86 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: b5ceeb11106449b9246ec02d26c6444e SHA-1: 5c026053912e223b0cb15aefbcae1dc54cc7dc50 SHA-256: fecf4673d0a0e5a9a1d7b0ef9af44c5cb91b43a33f5e28f3bfa960a7a879d93d
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote URL. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious static findings. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting they are not the primary execution vector. The primary IOC is the URL used for the remote payload download.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
    URL https://peprolinbot.es/EjLiyS
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
    URL https://arpo-sa.com/
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00136a00.pdf
5760cb0143ad231e9543c733875eca19a3b3903fa00f319dae475d37a8470d3c
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x136A00 678912 bytes