Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fec3cabd098350bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.42 MB First seen: 2026-05-16
MD5: 66c0edeaba3c94dcc78f1278652cf008 SHA-1: e99a57cccc6d01d77e07296e81c41dc21d747c54 SHA-256: fec3cabd098350bcd2e7a929ceafd020fde7d0cd4e543a3b2ad99cd60cd3529d
120 Risk Score

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject4.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.