Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fea5a7b3704a0100…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

218.0 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: a5772e4d505a879700aa2d9831d005ca SHA-1: 87eb8a88c9d565c3c62409de17a8d1e216b1b520 SHA-256: fea5a7b3704a0100c9116656d96fa533f7a8a7020b61e4faa863be5b2a0f1445
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE document exhibits significant slack space and appended executable data, indicating it likely serves as a container for a malicious payload. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended bytes with high entropy strongly suggests the file is designed to deliver a secondary stage. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 223,232 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 206,689 bytes (93%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.