PDF malware analysis — malicious · fe9e4bc6e00e0395

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.9 KB

MD5: 8a78e68bd17cdfee50548656e5e6cad0 SHA-1: 76995b49ae20d2bc97f199bacf32339ec5f3b19c SHA-256: fe9e4bc6e00e03957e848ce2be9740714e9d293460a9150ccfa14b8e0b4aee45

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, identified by multiple heuristics including PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS. A critical heuristic, CVE_2007_5659, indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability (Collab.collectEmailInfo) to execute a JavaScript stager. This stager is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the large size of the deobfuscated JavaScript and the ClamAV detection signature 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063'.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `4972b00c4b5ccf58df37ced77c30016d1c62b41e3af5bbd413c846ede928cccc`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5010 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `bccbfbab8811343a7662e152f149bd53462572e6b38c981b121bc9e4a8ffa212`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	75168 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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