Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe7e00f9e01387c9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

536.5 KB Created: xu´DT0!KnÒ625ÿǐ Authoring application: lå _t,U9b&W©Œ¹¾ÆHìu (via },ôNt9?4zom ›¸÷œ êE÷WZE)
MD5: 648159d049e17c46931d52597f4edb39 SHA-1: a3098bf491cf4daecdd42a92f975cf4084702366 SHA-256: fe7e00f9e01387c9344c350c68c64cdcc23bd34cfdc57ac13e607c256c2f0c42
66 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file is encrypted and contains JavaScript, indicating an attempt to conceal its true content and behavior. The presence of JavaScript actions and embedded JS streams suggests that the script is responsible for decrypting or executing the malicious payload. The PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE heuristic suggests the document may be designed to trick users into interacting with it, possibly by presenting an image that requires further action. The combination of encryption and JavaScript points to a downloader or dropper mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0613_001.js
f35d13ad7cfb9d08f9063691ac68f9bb6db7c4b1fc10982e26c1015f500881e6		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 613 at offset 0x1E6EC 33 bytes
javascript_obj0615_003.js
77c615245c0c1e3fbd9bcb51b51adbfd380cdd87d798764dd0a2f4875a05452d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 615 at offset 0x1E78D 33 bytes
javascript_obj0617_005.js
9ebd83527fc5baa85a3d7ba0eb865a0ff6bc6890ab7b1fd50390b027a32d3aa7		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 617 at offset 0x1E82D 33 bytes
javascript_obj0619_007.js
07d229bd66cc7888bf99e9875e1c62f3f45d488f58f0a4945994ca596020c6a9		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 619 at offset 0x1E8CE 33 bytes
javascript_obj0007_009.js
963cf2964f1b593e78c45184ea4fff28f0d869e066148b825abc925d50d1b884		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x20079 33 bytes
javascript_obj0156_084.js
9c68cb2e365e73e31ba51853b6810675bd0bd8e287d754485999e75eedf3dd7e		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 156 at offset 0x2C7D2 33 bytes

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