Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe7abdab0d32e44c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.5 KB Created: 2020-06-05 06:53:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e6bb2ca03d1ff45d5b533d7c6936db5d SHA-1: 4c86a85a1cfa571e7e08cbad0e1dce8d9c02e044 SHA-256: fe7abdab0d32e44c803e145b3b5da15eef8846f7177ff80bb9868e6e0121646b
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF document contains a significant number of external links, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious with high confidence. The embedded URLs suggest a link farm or redirection strategy, likely to distribute malicious payloads or conduct phishing. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct execution behavior.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://szlg.blog/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453049/131453049.html#irma+fuenlabrada+como+desarrollar+el
    • http://gracebcpc.net/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070851/wuvubexadewefi.pdf
    • http://thetastyj.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130435583/e20041e005c.pdf
    • http://bakerlawga.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130287992/vixavevelinaxekaso.pdf
    • http://inarq.net/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551182/46411dcde49.pdf
    • http://ajfinefoods.com.au/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738993/3059569.pdf
    • http://szlg.blog/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453049/terms.html
    • http://szlg.blog/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453049/dmca.html
    • http://szlg.blog/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453049/policy.html
    • https://kugebimik.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/ridakebinixeke.pdf
    • https://bizesipu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/30644246278.pdf
    • https://jedujasug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tomoxogaxab.pdf
    • https://towuferenin.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jawimoje.pdf
    • https://sirovopexib.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/62126508715.pdf
    • https://gixanike.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xazate.pdf
    • https://goxiwafiwavi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sivejog.pdf
    • https://lorapuz.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/2762035742.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00015bc7.bin
be4f4de791b52f2cef547a7677f56102938f68c53835a6cef6acf6a753bca540		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15BC7 12460 bytes

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