Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe76571af7dc2243…

MALICIOUS

PDF

97.0 KB Created: 2021-06-26 03:20:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: bd91a75a58fad7280c17b5cd423bc922 SHA-1: bbc9f4966e8d8e3884673774acef2ec2a7930f69 SHA-256: fe76571af7dc2243bb66a1a5b85c1829631d20e8ca2570d1fcaf98ffcefe0a2e
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution through these external links. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, but the URI heuristics are sufficient to determine the attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9936

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://voolabs.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf8dd0e1a42---jafubevelesono.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://anthonygillant.com/userfiles/file/57881183214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://omomediacion.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c60e2ee5bb3d67baad92b064f2caa5fa/rimivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arket.io/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tpp6p6i40boott45s1ka9otab6/temarukivojoratu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beijingxinzhi.com/userfiles/file/20210517074334_1522753360.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.neslihanonur.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d85ab8d361e98d7e962c6f8556b8454a/14153576340.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunargrup.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fp6tn6mpe9tbbl8cq055doj9m7/44788688343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lushexperiences.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609daba740379---nepevetifenaduvat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.carrentchiengmai.com/files/14824514101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sk-developers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093ad83cb84d---zutivubidog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.shipsupply.co.mz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160773f6de6ec1---29515980329.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cohn-vossen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c0266a7ec4---buwunipejiwif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.advancedevents.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081ab7d80ef9---rokorifanukoralepoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.infranetltd.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609090f0bf029---xogosafevarobekipuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fobiy.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c913687e7e4185975724b9030d0dfc95/wibebedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://telmeed.com/web/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bisenavob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bridalchapel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8b8654843a---76569513920.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.rebranded.tv/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160705d32803fe---37227347707.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hcibatiment.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2a1d5f22f5---dobesexojupadogo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc426447a3---sulisumusigenirinodi.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.jindatunnel.com/up_files/file/16673655473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://2girlstrippin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f86e66b6ec---kepele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.inhd.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160779e3706b6c---jejafobijinamamavinanot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aryaayur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab36afb73de---37937169021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/cv9VXjIrmdE/uplcv?utm_term=osha+safety+test+questions+and+answersPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001191f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1191F 17028 bytes
SHA-256: db0432fd1941bb267e2806982f563e4e209710a9a70c10e43b4773de25d23628
font_01_sfnt_off00014596.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14596 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00015dad.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15DAD 10876 bytes
SHA-256: 4cb476d324b73f47e3dcc0f11e1e0c59405587b781a48f65ac05b5f27739a423

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