Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe5b393f587160c5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB First seen: 2022-06-20
MD5: d227e859d669c3ce4e821c3c4c5132ba SHA-1: f83d835fc7ab3fdce39b3f6c4b6da991c9d194db SHA-256: fe5b393f587160c52f2223bac4ce54a390bdfcc086f810c478f7518d24bfc13e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploits targeting older Microsoft Office versions.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000068.bin
45264ae4fbac4a5e66475ad6ffb0b1157684fd089231d7ee4fb77d3a0dd1176a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x68 1849 bytes