Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe5b31f0bf9c8a12…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.63 MB
MD5: c811bfeba8f5ecd3fa4fe6e65dcc46af SHA-1: 32bd41b37872d0bd3d6376abbb29b8d0da47f1ac SHA-256: fe5b31f0bf9c8a120cd21da9a474ca1b083af0e23ee0e29ca42939009aa4e149
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability within the Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, likely to download and run a secondary payload. No document body text was available for further contextual analysis.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1709KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000041.bin
6aa3382bb281f863dc3458e7b9019e797fa979f69be1cab762fc4b0d57d82d88
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41 854984 bytes