Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe3d4647da281e7f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

164.1 KB Created: 2021-04-21 14:10:50 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 15.0300
MD5: 599ce087cc5f550db5e6af6133b6be19 SHA-1: 4025f5bfe38452647ce0796e3820960702d90b41 SHA-256: fe3d4647da281e7f5063094c332b3896cff4a1a4d021d1c00295e674ae7a7be9
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an XLSM file containing a Workbook_Open macro, indicating it is designed to execute malicious code upon opening. The macro uses CreateObject to likely download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the provided URLs. The Environ() call suggests potential environment variable manipulation. The presence of a Workbook_Open macro and CreateObject points to a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://streichersquickprint.biz/css/vendor/_notes/TED5iyLtzczFAV.php
    • https://vanesadonisi.com/wp-content/themes/brando/templates/archive-header/rUlGhpz7vj8KWBg.php
    • https://visualpro.planaweb.com.br/admin2020/themes/default/js/bundle/sqekPV3Pi9rtdRZ.php
    • https://www.dosashop.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ji4Ss8AIFkrdQ.php
    • https://mueblesromero.net/vmfiles/hHXXLCcJv0JgsF.php
    • https://partners.jpidigitalpay.in/bower_components/jquery/external/sizzle/dist/XWzOPMfraKRn.php
    • https://meaningful-marriage.co.za/wp-includes/sodium_compat/namespaced/Core/ChaCha20/Hp8nneMHunkah.php
    • https://rms.adeelchaudry.pk/util/XvwYAL5dS0EPsi.php
    • https://mindfulnessauthors.com/wp-includes/js/tinymce/plugins/charmap/gAvIGfBI.php

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8d3f677fa9a805a31829ebf8474ab64e7c3618b70a9d5a6343439855a8e242d3
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8884 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
5d55243f4e3401fb9df92316245043d8397a57312f7209a253755c89df837724
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 51712 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.