Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe38000650bb91c8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.71 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f0c779ec7573308d5c5bbf15762391d5 SHA-1: 6934649699360c8cf7a0d8dee37c994082268054 SHA-256: fe38000650bb91c8e0d5aee0a0bff8136d849d58dc6f7d9f35d33788abd9a799
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor CLSID. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759 via MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001a4803.bin
ba138a26b8ddab7da3f87cf01763ad7514273743e2b6201d467d883db066963d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A4803 3732 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.