Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fe291b2812968988…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-10-05 21:01:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 34d90bcf20f55519ce11971e801a4650 SHA-1: d0930153df6d51f5f2ac2f79ad8cdaf7bbd2eedc SHA-256: fe291b2812968988870d5770b9b7913a550f2d1b92883b69d38b43b3b1bf9b67
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the structure suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or engage in SEO manipulation for malicious purposes. No scripts were extracted, but the link farm nature is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=devuelveme+a+mi+chica+bass+tab In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036636.mozfiles.com/files/1036636/5029192627.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039278.mozfiles.com/files/1039278/96363846803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039958.mozfiles.com/files/1039958/30038463565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038954.mozfiles.com/files/1038954/rufegorigodije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037175.mozfiles.com/files/1037175/89712679921.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.aipdc.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070918/2e617a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043455.mozfiles.com/files/1043455/12289320270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043172.mozfiles.com/files/1043172/89683564321.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037850.mozfiles.com/files/1037850/45776704904.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036772.mozfiles.com/files/1036772/2585536938.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/05290d3e-f597-4e81-a24f-d45f88a708da/86601993282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/445198f3-a03a-4459-a142-75bab2785883/gipepegeguta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/af82a3cc-6229-423b-8053-0f710f09017e/rovitalunivuxakuxajuxevus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7a5d710f-2847-46be-898c-0887e6e964aa/92397024184.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ffa80d5d-f936-42d4-8305-f87bb12677bc/kosavowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004eb8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4EB8 4808 bytes
SHA-256: 357b20a06ea68ba3bfc88b59b85bcb5d45977dafd0b4f153ec2a7a9554934ebb
font_01_sfnt_off00005f26.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F26 13640 bytes
SHA-256: 7b4fe19547c65c2172d328bcfb2c57461feb5d745832606765e22c0db02e244d
font_02_sfnt_off00008a63.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8A63 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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