Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fdf34d8831064257…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.4 KB
MD5: f457c6f081129a03da727fce25b242d8 SHA-1: 5916b21b4f4ed78595739fee95ad7563852d2747 SHA-256: fdf34d883106425704777f9fa3c4a68309f10ee29d3fbb6579facf04ce920fc5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, including RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded OLE object, specifically the Equation Editor, is intended to be activated to execute arbitrary code. No document body or scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is sufficient to classify the attack pattern.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b90.bin
751a10076beadcbb1a55e34a8eca4145b81c93f135ebcf788accfba10e48a0df		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B90 1625 bytes

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