Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fdd5d749d1698c13…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

26.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-22
MD5: 9840c9899289996b82aab0f05ca06602 SHA-1: 6e5c776da6990e8b40e7b8134ac7eb70cdcb7c63 SHA-256: fdd5d749d1698c13ded5cd299eeb4706fadac0548f9a5588efcdb2d5f4e3b907
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body presents a lure related to a marketing assignment, instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit a vulnerability upon opening and user interaction.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000503e.bin
6a03b6b32d0432885394b1934b02b5c6251db9ab9951f174719e209d5f3a20dc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x503E 1494 bytes