Office (OOXML) malware analysis — malicious · fdd28c313c5426a7

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.9 KB Created: 2021-07-16 23:24:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000

MD5: 3e6a25c5d04c9423d329675bce19d5dc SHA-1: f26eb4a4cfe2b96fd11d4a4c8dffe36bc84e92c7 SHA-256: fdd28c313c5426a7f83b0db20da33eace37e0dcc4f4085a44002a5339db07c01

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an Auto_Open subroutine that executes a command. This command uses 'curl' to download a file from 'https://cdn.facade.cf/' and then executes it. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality, common in initial stages of compromise.

Heuristics 6

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD

cmd.exe reference in VBA
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://cdn.facade.cf/
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `09128d8eeaa6049f1f162501e3680580c126977a89cd5e8268b44e6c7eb4797c`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	429 bytes
`vbaProject_00.bin` `d43595707f2f3619f6022de8eb0040a91d40aac05f9719dbb188f61f502dc835`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	12288 bytes

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