Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fdbb2ac6c641eeae…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1011.5 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a9b798f391bf12851f885eb0a696b1fc SHA-1: d67ca4b35f77ded21e5e5f101bc69a694904d4b8 SHA-256: fdbb2ac6c641eeae342ba7a8e32d8cd40ec6749aa3d49f89cc6fbf934ebf3f41
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further supports the exploitation of OLE object activation. While no specific malware family is identified, the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000f42bf.bin
cb4400f1c589557ba4cbaff272c2589aa0bd0a3d2f90f5f0c2cec134d5fb4c0d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF42BF 3739 bytes