Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fd7861a557c90912…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

35.9 KB Created: 2020-06-04 23:22:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: e99850778996892373d11211e6d4bef6 SHA-1: 728cdb023d89f4b88f06b038d4a3bf6f8d28e0d8 SHA-256: fd7861a557c909123a642331fcf8fa8496327980b0cba0004507570948dbf944
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a DOCM document containing VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of CreateObject calls and the ClamAV detection as 'Win.Malware.Agent-8009398-0' strongly suggest that the VBA code is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific URLs or executable files were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Win.Malware.Agent-8009398-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Malware.Agent-8009398-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2b7c5d2394ea5b3b00a41c666356daf15501d691a08e10dacd06c56af23e15d3
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2418 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
676e86023a9688f47021f5b2c128d051340e41323662562b171f21af61a97ae9
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.