Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fd4e09466870b7d7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

464.1 KB Created: 2010-04-22 02:58:53 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 08eecac3c09410ff1aa292fecb2ea9ed SHA-1: e65f7c84fada29681c5c37a1364536baa85c0537 SHA-256: fd4e09466870b7d73556daf9a6a7f28ad3917b6c84d39fdc6015282e5dbdf6d1
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OLE document exhibits a significant slack space anomaly and contains an appended executable payload, indicating it's a container for malicious code. The inability to extract VBA macros suggests obfuscation or a legacy format, further supporting a malicious intent. The primary IOC is the file's SHA256 hash, as no other indicators were extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 475,235 bytes but its declared streams total only 26,491 bytes — 448,744 bytes (94%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.