Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fd2cf450e1c514cd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: af45a353b8c112989a7661752daa934c SHA-1: 3cd0c332080ff6ab4d89262f24df758b49b2cdd3 SHA-256: fd2cf450e1c514cd731fbbcff6c78143e96bfbac5d9b8f4cf5251c94cde4cf5f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009a.bin
5b5342b04670cc400c0a122dac0435ce03f3f7c28f863b92928b9babd7f524cc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9A 2141 bytes