Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fd2037cc15ef18c0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.5 KB Created: 2021-02-03 06:02:40 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 5aab850f3d6226bb8cf47d9ff53c5dfa SHA-1: ebd886cd8f3eb7e725ebd19f0bf646506604594d SHA-256: fd2037cc15ef18c006d787d6201f7b07d0c2e500150300830013c0029668b455
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/aws?utm_term=cavitron+prophy+jet+plus+manual In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jerivudofin/hBdEHdb/warlings_armageddon_mod_apk_hacked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nujidegowupi/ghajagj/39483707571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ragurinibobuma.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133986244/fed76087.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sobexofap/Aiajdgf/free_fire_hd_wallpaper_2020_3d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mulepava/hcugfcb/the_knife_one_hit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://runufegoxow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347372/4fd1e72.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nodewanase/dheKigF/pop_ceiling_design_catalogue.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suxavumopej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999634/bovipipuka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kitolitik/6hijbRG/run_fish_run_apk_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vedasukuki/oQzqUjb/6407622789.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wixadigizal/ThgEYw1/cellular_plus_verizon_fort_collins.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rijijuxika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346754/loxowumatogetatip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jajesawi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813829/xefaveseko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fosojatesog/gugfAgg/76435619871.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dapapakutuluj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384169/0a3227f8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lemapemoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040436/438395.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bopexetijajab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131411078/vanidurul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bumogebiz/fTznXgd/96308401703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c5bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC5BD 5200 bytes
SHA-256: ecc9ba478172fce1c74e5272144fab5d19e680ea7c4402aedcee63c44a9352f8
font_01_sfnt_off0000d752.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD752 11264 bytes
SHA-256: 139f435923a5365eaa6dda2c4772fd17d10a42dcb31c13f517b8df49db19eee3

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