Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fd1d1d4f70fb3b25…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.4 KB
MD5: 71af183490ef5c747eb3b6a1417c8f33 SHA-1: cbf5c744909fb1978d8bbadb3b1377e7b364f90d SHA-256: fd1d1d4f70fb3b258e798ba9ac66abd6ad9d9de16b4b2204f55519ea59eb7d12
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to achieve code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e2.bin
cc4ef15bec011072f5e96cacf0e39eaef9d320a8e4e4c3f19fd01ab013449f0b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE2 1968 bytes