RTF malware analysis — malicious · fd01045f31ef0fec

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.77 MB

MD5: 6daec53f24ac5b5fcfd4bd2e06139ee2 SHA-1: 90a19ab37e385ecaf6e6600032e465d95c45b2d8 SHA-256: fd01045f31ef0fecadcff000ef64a9cae53dc8ca6caa6d109c233c6f2d8c2b14

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor component, strongly indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 or a similar vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate control word forces automatic OLE activation, bypassing user interaction and ensuring the exploit is triggered upon document opening. While the specific payload was not recovered, the attack pattern is consistent with delivering a second-stage exploit or malware.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000011e1.bin` `2188c2d4c3501a8b38267b4331f23e8ebf7364bc4a343893a1be375350203f71`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1	53771 bytes
`objdata_01_off0002fc49.bin` `e1f744f201031a94b7338c99efa7dc221d6af19e0163291dabfeddbdf7cb992f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FC49	453383 bytes

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