Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fcf51490b96d913f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

25.9 KB Created: 2025-03-06 20:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2025-04-07
MD5: dfa605ed5f67ec4d9e67136d462b1adb SHA-1: 356dad29f42815a09b1ddd41ed117755299dabc5 SHA-256: fcf51490b96d913fdb1293d6d7c3c690d6c9eaafa15228ac8b3025eb560ef208
330 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The macro-enabled Excel file (XLSM) contains a Workbook_Open macro that prompts the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic. Upon enabling, it calls a subroutine that uses WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute obfuscated commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload from the provided URLs. The obfuscated shell command with a URL points to a critical technique for payload delivery.

Heuristics 9

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bdnews25.com/wp-includes/assets/conva/7z.txt
    • https://bdnews25.com/wp-includes/assets/conva/pulsacrypted.zip
    • https://bdnews25.com/wp-includes/assets/conva/7z.txt$

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b05bbda6b1968c1d13f28ff23fcc9dd8347cc1246918c080633b973ee5511717		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 10273 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
25934aea53c77d2bdc6eb77f66a85f0dca577798f02081710af07c802917c4e1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 30720 bytes
emf_00.emf
9620d8057b26ef9ef2de3ba72c4e034973397cd1d9d2990bbcd15f8a8b05817c		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image1.emf 2856 bytes

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