Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fceb0f4bbfb8943f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: 38179760a71b2e6b6522d6801cb89179 SHA-1: ad15a87bd4515b600efe05f157b0896d76c798aa SHA-256: fceb0f4bbfb8943f73a62792306bfca22aaf6cddd7f70b350265ee6295394805
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specific firings for the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ".objupdate" and the "Equation.3" ProgID strongly suggest that the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability, likely leading to arbitrary code execution upon opening. No document body or script content was available for further analysis.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
48768b25934046a886aa8ba30f4f4001f3d283a251f4f3bcf7bb42094edb8d56
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27182 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca1d.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA1D 475057 bytes