Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fce17777357de2ed…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

18.0 KB Created: 2021-08-18 08:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 7eb221173e11f56a40e2744795a9744c SHA-1: 9684536a1b03674d4945921d0b2a80ff937e83cf SHA-256: fce17777357de2ed965a57c0f8bc5a9f5708a3381fa1876eb1d6f21f8f3e8771
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is likely an executable payload, exploiting CVE-2026-21514. The document's purpose is to deliver and execute this embedded payload upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
93e84422fa277ec1976656975654d114af8018a000b690ec5696dca767760a85		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 11264 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d8e8e022ab85f5ab32d308a4df479e2ecc87f2805c28a790e7778eff16143a81		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2864 bytes
emf_00.emf
d007d6160b04a459285ee73c58403c30c438d9bd0c3091ff2cc67cbc72ce7e84		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5340 bytes

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