Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fcdf034e8f6454be…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.03 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: ad711e5b3d1812ef0484d60e41bf9781 SHA-1: a146e59d5af1c2ed0dc2235bfcfb927c343f5308 SHA-256: fcdf034e8f6454bee5374b2437c9727350e2b775acf984b96e7ad52157219977
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor component within RTF documents. The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive further support that this is an exploit attempting to activate embedded objects. While no specific second-stage payload or network indicators were directly extracted, the exploit's nature points towards arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000ff3ce.bin
ffeb20cc7b50c92ec2e6db2327955bfe0f5225584830114486c569a685ab8a9e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xFF3CE 3739 bytes

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