Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fcd615d2627e6a96…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

114.5 KB Created: 1999-08-12 15:27:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 05d24dc016bc56c1b8c1f9ebc65576c7 SHA-1: 00394e6db66fb9e4d2b666cce3047834a6b4c857 SHA-256: fcd615d2627e6a96d76547859cb547e285340501df3447b4f64193572230beae
140 Risk Score

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 89,798 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 89,798 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00006b3a.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x6B3A 89798 bytes
SHA-256: d080c2f746347e2c203cd36d15f98c2e49bccd9af962d55c2cbf8b033f331318