Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fcbe9fd47a6eed27…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.1 KB Created: 2021-09-02 10:18:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: e9c85e983604f40edd5d68fc20a8f5e7 SHA-1: ba38d6443e6ea49f343ae1a8fd2be8e7e9435142 SHA-256: fcbe9fd47a6eed27c015f461e882806c24ff18d9edfde1565dbe9d83d63b2ca8
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1539 Steal or Forge Credentials

This PDF document is classified as malicious by ML models and ClamAV, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing and credential harvesting attack. The document's content, though heavily obfuscated in the provided excerpt, is designed to lure users into revealing sensitive recovery secrets or private keys, aligning with the 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' heuristic. Additionally, the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic suggests an attempt to trick users into executing commands, potentially to exfiltrate data or download further payloads. The numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting indicate a broad phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=me+and+the+key+2+level+7 PDF link annotation
    • http://kccmaul.com/files/files/doseso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cashofferoregon.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cf5c5154833---40604284549.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://benchmarktransitions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b087e5267e---45524386596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vietxetai.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e2rr468ktldm73brt8dntlljk4/nezosasozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.stockholmswingallstars.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609688a641d35---jezizasab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://brylka-kfz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1611e74ff12e43---37805741060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.mueblesgamez.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xerizigenomud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hightechrustremovers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072c1bd6d56f---8954538238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nguyenthelong.net/userfiles/files/39042163368.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://123natura.com/stockages/files/sigijakakuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://krono-original.vn/Images_upload/files/jozaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jamesbgriffinlaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094a6045465c---60001474423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ajivikafinance.com/userfiles/file/57478300787.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://azinsaghf.com/cache/fck_files/file/69847234930.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rhagro.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/948319b982cf5fb48f1a5441f986c440/zorikuleminirova.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cecprint.com/images/file/kojusu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://enville.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608040da64ae5---93085749490.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxikladis.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ca27f04e304---kebekepivisasuzobin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ivanda-commerce.hr/userfiles/file/14187635349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.audifonosdoshoydos.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ccc55610187---88508655649.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nct-vn.com/userfiles/file/nirixedowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chuyennhakienvangvn.net/upload/files/zawuroxubowita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wurstfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ce1becc4805c580334c4bb8fd2c72ce/76924758645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://taevlingar.se/images/pages/file/pujugekusamidipenapaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dde5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDDE5 10300 bytes
SHA-256: 277d9f33b745542ed1bfd9a1aa83bea312de6d44c6927c26f0e5177fe0d7230e
font_01_sfnt_off0000f51c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF51C 18756 bytes
SHA-256: 1ce5b5a89ae3ca8e2d3fce46e84b32c04c3fa1f994306bc8c302bbfd96eb7a1e
font_02_sfnt_off000126bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x126BD 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1