Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fcb2b19261558c84…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB
MD5: 8430f5d927a93451bc2a05ee56f4f89d SHA-1: 016a53507369b717a9da568fd8eb597eb4007c9e SHA-256: fcb2b19261558c842d55e92c246360765a25e8e4f903c52e10636bf98cbca0da
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and triggers a critical heuristic for the Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit (CVE-2010-2883). The presence of JavaScript actions and streams, along with the specific exploit, indicates an attempt to compromise the user's system. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, reinforcing the likelihood of a malicious exploit rather than a legitimate document. The embedded JavaScript is the primary mechanism for executing the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883
    PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0012_000.js
ca747a4e3ab37962151e9108ee39ad98aaff0e0e1a5160c42ad0e7546d035832		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xA0BA 3700 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000033c.bin
683fcffe9abaad29001e134bdd9ad7d1628d5cbbf628c451b6c621f202a7dae4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C 65932 bytes

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