Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fca327a07db22999…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.28 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: ed8d3d16c7f99644bc0d8d42590a88bf SHA-1: 445cc2781d3df0d688aa2566f37e368dbd5fe79e SHA-256: fca327a07db22999539c70fd7720c712e90780a04144bbb7fc3f27fd77d68a7c
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics for Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-8759) and OLE object activation. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to gain execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE further supports the exploitation of embedded objects. The benign URL is likely a red herring or part of the exploit structure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00139201.bin
5e8190da5cb6454664f4edd7f63d1c4c311354a689542a52ac0a6c05459f772c		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x139201 3732 bytes

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