Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fc85bf703e90e02b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

68.5 KB Created: 2021-09-15 10:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 970be1c59242aa7d82b6d34a3cdbfe3a SHA-1: a87e5e80b6e9047da8cd93b8e1b9a04ea80f7b6b SHA-256: fc85bf703e90e02bfb7d56190ee07147ada4bcdbdb69b34af8a6c5308e130529
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing VBA macros. The `document_open` macro is triggered upon opening, which writes content to a file named `pwCurrPw.hta`. It then executes this file using `wscript.exe`, indicating a downloader functionality. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic further supports the delivery of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BluePaletteW09211-9893001-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BluePaletteW09211-9893001-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
caea01fe440c90cc7def4d6375adcbeabc1ca37e903f9627ea511dfc64ae3f6f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 691 bytes

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