Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fc7229756802092c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

178.7 KB Created: 2021-03-23 02:20:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 84101f27c7f7e88b9b3fdcca6f797e9f SHA-1: 527709df2ca28bf55a39deb3e6a4a29fe667fc4e SHA-256: fc7229756802092c029511c4ed610030713a5b6560e0412f40e8ff025ea7412d
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF file flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious. It contains an embedded URI pointing to a suspicious domain, vilenefex.ru, which is likely used to host a phishing page or distribute further malware. The document body is heavily obfuscated, preventing a clear understanding of its specific lure, but the presence of the external URI strongly suggests a malicious intent to redirect the user.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://vilenefex.ru/wix?keyword=raleigh+elementary+school+districts
    • http://sejunirawor.22web.org/bunton_48_walk_behind_commercial_mower_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tamejenonisi/jaheBVO/rugovikojojirilezozu.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nikofilexi/ihd0Oli/jukuxipajenanajopinivin.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dasisogi/gdhivjj/fox_sports_liverpool_vs_chelsea.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pulobegefuzi/eViiWhb/get_followers_app_2020.pdf
    • http://fevumajugo.iblogger.org/reading_comprehension_passages_with_questions_and_answers_for_high_school.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5c25edfe-388c-446f-8275-e0a235898efd/39718072527.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sazixipame/iifa_awards_2019_link.pdf
    • http://wokoziguroron.rf.gd/63211260414.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kubedukowug/86211519957.pdf
    • http://gurapaf.epizy.com/star_wars_ahsoka_lightsaber_colors.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6393b679-4666-4946-a174-f6ec2f005feb/sears_12_belt_drive_band_saw-sander_manual.pdf
    • http://rorevofiw.epizy.com/61626843124.pdf
    • http://xadamodovupeniz.rf.gd/background_images_for_pc.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dufekifaral/storm_radar_pro_apk.pdf
    • http://rudixexo.epizy.com/xobokifinutamoworevil.pdf
    • http://widagutevutedik.epizy.com/82667763782.pdf
    • http://webubekesivamuf.epizy.com/58375637495.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xezonijida/xusososim.pdf
    • http://vomifavub.epizy.com/aiou_fa_supply_date_sheet_2019.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xakajoziwibi/xisuzipigaxe.pdf
    • http://sodojok.rf.gd/is_social_media_research_primary_or_secondary.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/50b95e74-58c1-4167-a0f9-e702a4ce1c7c/give_me_liberty_summary_chapter_16.pdf
    • http://junonuzutivo.epizy.com/non_disclosure_agreement_template_uk.pdf
    • http://xuwiviw.rf.gd/resefozupokalimixekon.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000284e4.bin
6e3e81d88e6c4c2143921ce098ce188a5ca179646dcd090fab7ddf731a372706
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x284E4 5464 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00029753.bin
f5750794b903a40ff2eceaf54f43aa0319148462ec82163a9aa7a09cec1fd6e5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x29753 11116 bytes