Office (OOXML) / .DOCM malware analysis — malicious · fc49653f92d0d7af

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

56.5 KB Created: 2020-05-28 14:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000

MD5: f5c4509437928949e03888e9cd05b0cf SHA-1: 10b395d5392d42bcc8f9e30f746833a445ea4e31 SHA-256: fc49653f92d0d7afe7b095c3ff57caf9f6e956c2fd667e881781c7c193d202b7

320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The document contains a VBA macro that executes a Base64-decoded command. This command uses PowerShell to download an executable file from 'https://blog.paulucyeletros.com.br/HSXu44uC2qQLIyo.exe' and save it as 'Filename.exe' in the temporary directory. The macro also attempts to establish persistence by writing to the registry key 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy'. The presence of a Document_Open macro and Shell() calls indicates a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document.

Heuristics 8

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT

WScript.Shell usage
VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER

VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `5fe099aaf617f1662dd4ea60c558807ed1005688f26288f2d4e51702eb7bbee0`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	2698 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
`vbaProject_00.bin` `0e5da7bf7d40eeb5ff939d4fff8266315600503a66a838e201cdb7bcb268f27f`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	11776 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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