Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · fc0f203a62c83982

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

101.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-22

MD5: fb6cead72d8c1eae6266cd849b8f01df SHA-1: 8c85c9b9e6f6089577456e3fb4816d85fb41abc3 SHA-256: fc0f203a62c839829d1c7c886abf5f2ca13b82309feced1ae093fff81327324c

142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OOXML exploit carrier shape is designed to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, http://jmcglone.com@107.175.3.10/https/https.doc, is likely the source of the second-stage payload. The document's encryption further supports its role as an exploit carrier.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE

Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE

OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML

OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://jmcglone.com@107.175.3.10/https/https.doc

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