Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbfa00a62076770f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

515.6 KB Created: 2016-07-28 19:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: 44bb8eeaf69bc9d6c7d8634e34d52c97 SHA-1: ca167b79cdbf44f758fb33d98949a7c266330721 SHA-256: fbfa00a62076770fb6caac0d6e57da9bae959d9ee739339cdf771d816828e30f
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros and an embedded OLE object. The OLE object is identified as a package payload that combines shell, network-fetch, and execute markers, indicating it's designed to download and run a second-stage executable. The VBA macro itself contains a simple MsgBox, but the primary malicious functionality is likely within the embedded OLE object, which points to URLs for fetching payloads.

Heuristics 6

  • Ole10Native package payload is a download-and-execute script critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_SCRIPT_DROPPER
    The OLE Package's embedded payload contains a script that hosts a shell (PowerShell/WScript/mshta), fetches a remote resource, and executes it — a download-and-run dropper. Embedding such a script inside an Office document via the Object Packager is a direct user-execution delivery technique (MITRE T1204.002), not a benign attachment.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (13 URLs) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.usertrust.com0 Embedded OLE package script
    • https://secure.comodo.net/CPS0FEmbedded OLE package script
    • http://ocsp.comodoca.com0Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-ocsp.ws.symantec.com07In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ocsp.thawte.com0In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/Embedded OLE package script
    • http://crl.usertrust.com/AddTrustExternalCARoot.crl05Embedded OLE package script
    • http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODOSHA256CodeSigningCA.crl0wEmbedded OLE package script
    • http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODOSHA256CodeSigningCA.crt0$Embedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-aia.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.cer0In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ts-crl.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.crl0In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://crl.thawte.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/0In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettingsEmbedded OLE package script
    • http://ts-crl.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.crl0(In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 404 bytes
SHA-256: c81a2ab24d105469300de319e55fde08551e4849012916a74986fd095bf70cc5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub Hello()
'
' NewMacros.Hello Macro
'
'
MsgBox ("Hello Bethesda!")
End Sub
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 538624 bytes
SHA-256: 657d87d744f67c4cb6120f683c86e609e021fec2b9b8fbc663f56db2c5b74fad
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 531671 bytes
SHA-256: 0a6a812b8b3a36786fc1c33b56a5cdf711845876ff2d80b0199703079680fac5
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Word_Macro-Enabled_Document1.docm 9783 bytes
SHA-256: b7de778afa7b6b7d578d5d83d647b61f24cbc1a2cc17658e0f9b2de3c14ab707
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10752 bytes
SHA-256: d6a5f8d95d1e3f746be15968d785ed9cbe7775db7aac8083f1fe0399a2f97398
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 160 bytes
SHA-256: 57c344d0da5d1f99d55bc976aca479c3da7bf56bfcad9e27653ce1b4eb7f28dc
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5440 bytes
SHA-256: 35db708e32d8ce41342ddf4e175c7d542627e8c98e563de7cadc2033e6090722

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