Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbea5326fdf87eae…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.9 KB
MD5: 6163943a76264b9c0a1c8b4690c48182 SHA-1: c3f4a992154f8e54a9391bc70ef6515023a47298 SHA-256: fbea5326fdf87eaea9442ff7653be74e021556fa98c59e8d9f36c484470eb643
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This exploit is designed to allow arbitrary code execution. The PDF contains XFA forms and embedded scripts, which are commonly used to deliver exploits. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
aa6637ec7d5cb403c389cc5930bcbed975e8a17dbbb360c62f05420668ca79bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101566 bytes