Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbe47defb5bf718d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

585.2 KB
MD5: 1103923de770bba0894e2c364e6ebbea SHA-1: 0c65266a85a68cfbb0897fd433fd9e87798b5112 SHA-256: fbe47defb5bf718d5daae15d8c29d6ba4c69bc63d637435ff75ef301fcab65ef
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an Office document that is password-encrypted, a common technique to evade static analysis. Heuristics indicate it's an exploit carrier, suggesting it's designed to deliver a secondary payload. The encryption and malformed structure further support its malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.

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