RTF malware analysis — malicious · fbdcc535fcdac253

MALICIOUS

RTF

60.1 KB First seen: 2023-09-07

MD5: 40822c00cc644540a2ed364b74a3f0e7 SHA-1: 63a829fa6df6ee3c228ce5b316fc1b00543e7886 SHA-256: fbdcc535fcdac2536b185aba57caf70851981bfe5e8b35f879a939aa9d8ceb38

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an exploit attempt leveraging the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002ad0.bin` `a6fb08302083e20e95b683c5fa9f458116ef12c3b76b0e61fa08ed9817bb200f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2AD0	2108 bytes

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