Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbcbbbbdb5bedde8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2020-11-22 03:00:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 16a6ed7350daabcb8cd8b186b03666bc SHA-1: 1d4bd436d10bc0c2261e407619fe0bc3072d6fbc SHA-256: fbcbbbbdb5bedde86bf2ea703c99f9ed6da0421019fa1856c24c0a6299bb34aa
196 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a heuristic indicating a 'Clipboard command execution lure', suggesting the document instructs users to copy and paste content into a command-line interface. This is a common technique to bypass security controls and execute malicious commands. The presence of external links, including one to a PDF file hosted on S3, further supports the likelihood of a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism. ClamAV detection and ML classification confirm the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/123?utm_term=create+clipping+mask+photoshop PDF link annotation
    • https://fogofude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322730/3759640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jobikituloxexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134456837/9506126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4443329/normal_5f9e27ce62daf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ridoduna.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134528127/2098134.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vagonegasix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482995/9920973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duniripil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134667737/f767a8c5f3c932.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367622/normal_5f87463c58b88.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rekawexuretowo/pabupifafegujagulejife.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pulujolatepuv/lekajadegekeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cf2fee07-3bf5-46de-bc71-89265f794038/62100793635.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jusuberu/super_mario_flash_unblocked_games_64.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0a582f18-64ad-4c5c-a2ef-f5da9d9a61f0/loteria_de_sumas_y_restas_para_imprimir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2ee36858-e07c-43aa-9bab-17a8e0212d12/76760796727.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/venunamazozuzo/6689239925.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sugaguxagu/pigogutigebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/naramuro/ebay_eyeglasses_dior.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ravuxudibure/ross_jeffries_patterns_47.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d30d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD30D 5316 bytes
SHA-256: fc0f130a2fd4f67bc60e8a56a735864e687a9023a8868309b56ac2af6f8e845c
font_01_sfnt_off0000e4f3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4F3 10408 bytes
SHA-256: 563b4eb68278e4d25558fdb55190536be847198f9883b3e24dcfe984e6179e85

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