Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fbbfedd0b5b91146…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.8 KB Created: 2021-03-26 17:15:19 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2c5af54e5cec348f651a41f4c1086145 SHA-1: e544538fa124516776a15a1f13630a5ae7cea86f SHA-256: fbbfedd0b5b911463437f72d84d645d88f9d4ec3f57ae5d91b8d1855533e1f34
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a significant number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The presence of embedded URLs and the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic strongly indicate that the primary function of this document is to redirect users to potentially harmful external sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://soxebez.ru/123?utm_term=apogee+jam+96k+android
    • https://mifoxafakefan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969175/rarofamuxopawodot.pdf
    • http://lemixebu.22web.org/34525057325.pdf
    • https://lorukadewe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134348028/resibabijitasido.pdf
    • https://bujabofilurukok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682168/863e6f.pdf
    • https://bodovusinorone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347185/fesukewime-somef-kefamixunajos-kotikovel.pdf
    • https://sivagodumojuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235915/14cf210b.pdf
    • https://bakogala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384254/duviwurud.pdf
    • https://wajegeteb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134896445/darilavevo.pdf
    • https://viledilexemapol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134698440/zakibo.pdf
    • http://jazabezul.iblogger.org/10500574111.pdf
    • https://keninowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134617270/5f0ebf.pdf
    • https://gawobomune.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317514/2322485.pdf
    • https://vilegewadaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135324537/barabujewipoxoxe.pdf
    • https://naluzakagowu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131411806/6039766.pdf
    • https://wunepilupizuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857535/895dd592c4c.pdf
    • https://finukezazilifer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776017/zigopek-galow-milivox-nerakelubodexu.pdf
    • https://zunenevalomedo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134855990/dd386e116835.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://befakugidutoj.rf.gd/kiwasofumamafavufek.pdf
    • http://mevafefulasi.rf.gd/busizigapelil.pdf
    • https://ca3ec1ac-6ff7-4c8f-ae0f-86a30d86e335.filesusr.com/ugd/3615fb_5a40833b6f664e46bf3217b6c9ca8d71.pdf?index=true
    • https://71f68c9c-1037-483c-a0ca-f268b7ddd3c8.filesusr.com/ugd/87fdc7_b112aa754ba54b3a942a5dd7e4353ff6.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee23.bin
357276751ceba49a1fa00b7104fdedcb146920b0a5bfb463ca5e9d0d4fa73c8f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE23 5508 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000100d4.bin
6d1a59672ccd349555537493c317e6a4e8e650a88512f6c5779a140c4647c8ec		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100D4 11096 bytes

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