Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb96ca5c0b97a883…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

8.0 KB
MD5: 99beb2bebc8248572ded390c0aae8f76 SHA-1: dc5a1426c3c708f83d829136c223d466fd1d5a47 SHA-256: fb96ca5c0b97a8832fdcac5ec79c03255b29e602c30575bca2f2a054cb3d4397
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not available for analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a78.bin
f2c222c128d54c0ed24ce4bb789e96d3902420255d9bab0a0f752198139269ab
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA78 2097 bytes