Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb903e458c450d29…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 1347f1c97470365c253ba53ec2e1ff94 SHA-1: dd14686cc7b25a7d3a74cf90f333ad96620e6b54 SHA-256: fb903e458c450d299021a51492a41f1b768154a2d901311063233f980b98d10c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to exploitation. This is a common delivery mechanism for older exploits targeting Microsoft Office.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
a4bfacce19e71293db6983bdabafb3d21fb1c455c9115aa68db145a59604b30b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1804 bytes