Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb678c5c0e9dfb29…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.35 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 3564ae31fbd0417674e60e71cb1b0f10 SHA-1: 845e9c3d36ded3de8a57c6c81c7318577b851626 SHA-256: fb678c5c0e9dfb294c67907f2d195ab7a5046458e00983e74319b272de7f06b4
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759. This indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office to achieve code execution. The presence of objupdate suggests the exploit is triggered automatically upon opening the document.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0014fc58.bin
8288b69cc168a216eabf99bbc2fefff795ce99778cc8c7a6f9eda6c610e33468		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14FC58 3732 bytes

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