Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb26eea29c31449b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.2 KB Created: 2020-08-03 05:26:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7ab0e3d2be0ee6be2dc4779bccabe657 SHA-1: 9d4279f17a89a51769f96a973bf01355b68ca7b3 SHA-256: fb26eea29c31449b0a28bcc4f58499b62ec3f8a553d9f4fa345cef0c68e6c303
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a mass external link farm, with a primary URL pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a reference to 'samsung tablet' and the malicious URL, suggesting a phishing lure. The redirector URL is designed to lead users to potentially malicious content.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=ce0168+samsung+tablet
    • http://files.dreamsnseams.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738924/vibatepa.pdf
    • http://xerokisi.potomacteaparty.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775129/silinudowunipe_zavofo_nikikiw_xebujumewogidoz.pdf
    • http://files.handmadebylouisa.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775827/25f7f89e987e0.pdf
    • http://files.dreamsnseams.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/13073
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8951/1071/files/pimifikotelekotijeg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0681/1560/files/842015693.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0970/9976/files/99356917917.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4979/4213/files/breaking_dawn_part_2_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3475/4728/files/durexoligafojexaveguxajik.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8919/9268/files/mupugozonupake.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3538/6265/files/67983345217.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2826/6654/files/42201600967.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1075/2663/files/avery_5162_template.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4411/9462/files/tanat.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/danedogorolulefumatexa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5344/8358/files/d3_node_double_click.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000080f9.bin
424ee6a76ce507c75ef510d1891453b1b400c04450ced403969c94966e43a193		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80F9 5336 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009301.bin
57ff280b38e1da0b73e67e89e14996e21f25dca1d412764d38d9baaa6442e82a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9301 10228 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000b5e1.bin
1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB5E1 4324 bytes

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