Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb0e922e9870e799…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 56077241ed78ccacbef96387942c374f SHA-1: 939043a175739d91f945801f3488bab0a6950f5f SHA-256: fb0e922e9870e7996a3140ee02f3c6ceb8c73164839c7c516bd2183ae30c5370
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, often initiated via spearphishing.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000cb.bin
69b781a0882cfc7ca6d3a414591ef3f99fa7765259ad2a97cb29cf67e826bb14
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCB 1798 bytes